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On June 12, 2020, the Minnesota Board of Pardons voted

The Binger Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School (the “BCNA”) assumed Ms. Shefa’s
representation in immigration court. Seeing few paths to
Ms. Shefa’s freedom, the BCNA filed for clemency for Ms.
Shefa on the grounds that hers, if ever one existed, was a case
of “unfortunate guilt”3 that should be mitigated through a
pardon. A pardon would save her from deportation.

In December 2013, Amreya Shefa had been raped and abused
by her husband one time too much. She stabbed him 30
times, causing his death. She was charged with murder, and
after a bench trial, a judge in Hennepin County convicted her
of manslaughter. While acknowledging that Ms. Shefa was
the victim of abuse, the court reasoned that Ms. Shefa had
“exceed[ed] the degree of force required to defend herself.”2
Ms. Shefa was sentenced to seven years in prison. She served
her sentence in full. Upon completion of her sentence and
because of her manslaughter conviction, Ms. Shefa was held
by immigration authorities to be deported to her home
country where she feared her husband’s family – which had
vowed a blood revenge – would kill her.

Background

MACDL WEIGHS IN ON THE MOST
CONSEQUENTIAL PARDON CASE IN
125 YEARS
JaneAnne Murray1

One hundred and twenty-five years ago, the Minnesota
electorate voted to modify the Governor’s then plenary
pardon power to require that it be exercised “in conjunction
with” a Board of Pardons, composed of the Governor, the
Attorney General and the Chief Justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Today, pardon applicant Amreya Shefa
awaits the outcome of a case before the Supreme of Court of
Minnesota that will decide what these apparently collegial
and modest words “in conjunction with” mean. Do they
mandate, as the Minnesota legislature decided in 1897,
one year after the constitutional amendment, that the
governor’s pardon power be subject to a unanimous vote
from the three-member Board of Pardons, or do they require
something less stringent – at the very least no more than a
majority vote of the three Pardon Board members? The issue
has profound ramifications for Ms. Shefa, whose pardon
application garnered a 2-1 vote and who believes that she
faces almost certain death if not granted a pardon that will
save her from deportation. But it also impacts the thousands
of pardon and commutation applicants in this state for whom
the Governor’s clemency power is the only meaningful
opportunity for relief from disproportionately long sentences
or who suffer life-limiting collateral consequences because of
their prior conviction.

2

The Federalist No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).

1/23/2015 Decision of Hon. Judge Elizabeth Cutter at 18, ¶ 12.
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JaneAnne Murray is a member of the MACDL board, and director of the Clemency Project at the University of
Minnesota Law School. In connection with the drafting of the MACDL amicus, MACDL acknowledges the invaluable
research and analysis of Scott Dewey, J.D., Ph.D., a historian at the Law School’s library, Ingrid Hofeldt, a J.D. Candidate
at the Law School, and Margaret Colgate Love, Executive Director of the Collateral Consequences Resource Center.
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2-1 in favor of granting the pardon (with Governor Walz
and Attorney General Ellison in favor of the pardon and
Chief Justice Lorie Gildea opposed). Because the statutes
implementing the constitutional pardon power provided that
the Board of Pardons, alone, exercised the power, and also
required a unanimous vote of board members, Ms. Shefa’s
pardon application was denied.4 She then proceeded to
challenge the constitutionality of this unanimity requirement
in district court in Ramsey County.

Judge Laura Nelson’s Decision
Judge Laura Nelson ruled on Ms. Shefa’s motion on April
20, 2020. The court concluded, “[t]he plain language of
art. V, § 7 names the Governor separate and apart from the
Board of Pardons, of which he is a member. Based on this
plain language, and applying the canon against surplusage,
the Governor has some pardon power or duty separate
or apart from the Board of Pardons.”5 Accordingly, the
district court ruled that the challenged statutes—“which
give pardon power to the ‘Board of Pardons’ alone”—are
unconstitutional.6 The district court declined to “address
the argument that the correct interpretation of [the pardon
provision of the Minnesota Constitution] would require that
a pardon be effective if the Governor and one other member
of the Board . . . voted yes.”7

Supreme Court Grants Request for
Accelerated Review

MACDL’s Amicus Brief
The scope of the pardon power is an issue with unique
resonance for MACDL. As criminal defense lawyers, we are
painfully familiar with the harshness and injustice endemic
in our criminal legal system, its pervasive racial and economic
disparities, and the limited availability of judicial “second
look” mechanisms after a conviction is final. Clemency, even
if exercised sporadically, is a powerful statement against cruel
laws and prosecution practices, and a reaffirmation of the
humanity principle that those in the crosshairs of the criminal
legal system are capable (and, in the right circumstances,
deserving) of redemption.
MACDL also has a more specific interest. We recently
inaugurated a clemency project in collaboration with (“in
conjunction with,” if you will) NACDL to recruit and train
volunteer lawyers to represent applicants for state clemency
in Minnesota. Given that this process has been shamefully
parsimonious in this state over the last several decades (only
two commutations in 30 years, and a pardon rate that is
overshadowed by many other states), MACDL has a direct
interest in seeing an invigoration of the clemency process in
Minnesota.

all Pardon Board members – and thus a potential veto by
of which shall consist of the attorney general of the
one member.
State of Minnesota and the chief justice of the supreme
court of the State of Minnesota, and whose powers and
We opened our amicus brief by highlighting the uniquely
duties shall be defined and regulated by law, to grant
personal nature of an act of clemency – it is an act of empathy
reprieves and pardons after conviction for offenses against
by an individual leader towards a human being deserving of
the State, except in cases of impeachment.
mercy. This quality was preserved by the 1896 electorate
when it chose to continue to enumerate the pardon power See Minn. Const. Art. V § 4 (as amended in 1896)
as one of the governor’s constitutional powers. We then (enumerating the powers of the governor) (emphasis added).8
analyzed the nature of “boards” in early American life, While this power is exercised “in conjunction with” the Board
and the electorate’s likely understanding of the term as one of Pardons, it remains a power that the Governor exercises in
founded on the republican principle of one-person-one-vote their individual capacity. This was in keeping both with the
and majority rule. We concluded with an analysis of all other practice at the time in almost all of the states and with the
nine constitutional pardon boards established in other states humanity principles underlying the power itself.
by 1896 – none of which required unanimity of all members
of the board before a pardon could issue, and in fact eight As Alexander Hamilton observed in opposing an “advice
of which explicitly permitted a vote on a majority basis. and consent” procedure for its counterpart in the federal
In short, the available evidence from the historical record constitution (and upon which the Minnesota constitutional
indicates that the 1896 electorate would have interpreted the provision was based), “one [person] appears to be a more
of the mercy of government, than a body
“in conjunction with [a board]” language to mean something eligible dispenser
9
Minnesotans today understand well: a collegial process where of [people].” Hamilton’s views were echoed in those of
the discursive obligation encourages compromise, but if the federalist and future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell,
parties cannot agree, a majority vote prevails and no one who similarly advocated that the power to be merciful be
reposed in one individual: “and where could it be more
person has a veto power.
properly vested, than in a man who had received such
1. The 1896 Electorate Privileged the Governor
strong proofs of his possessing the highest confidence of the
people?”10
Minnesota’s constitutional pardon provision, as amended by
the Minnesota electorate in 1896, squarely grants the pardon The Supreme Court later acknowledged in interpreting the
power to the Governor. As the language of the amendment federal constitutional pardon provision, that the pardon
presented to the electorate back then stated:
power was “the ‘private . . . act’ of the executive magistrate;”11
in other words, the pardon provision, while “a part of the
. . . he [the governor] shall have power, in conjunction
Constitutional scheme,”12 was specifically designed to be a
with the board of pardons, of which the governor
human decision with limited restraints.
shall be ex officio a member, and the other members

See Minn. Stat. §§ 638.01; 638.02.

11

Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (Holmes, J.).

Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915) (emphasis added).

Mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition for amici
not to duplicate arguments in this case, MACDL’s amicus
brief focused on a discrete issue: the meaning of the word
“board” in the amendment presented to the 1896 electorate.
Whereas previously the Governor had unfettered pardon
discretion in cases that did not involve impeachment, the
proposed constitutional amendment required them to work
in conjunction with a “board.” But nothing in the text of
the amendment or indeed in its legislative history put the
electorate on notice that in implementing legislation to
be enacted the next year, this singular and personal act of
executive empathy would be subject to a unanimous vote of

Decision of the Hon. Laura E. Nelson, entered in this case at the district court level on April 20, 2021, at 11.

12

Chief Justice Gildea and Attorney General Ellison appealed
Judge Nelson’s decision and Justice Gildea sought accelerated
review, a motion that was granted by the Supreme Court on
July 20, 2021. As Ms. Shefa’s potential deportation looms,
briefing was ordered to occur within a seven-week window
and argument is scheduled for September 15, 2021.

4

Id.

The Federalist No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).

8
Although the pardon power was later moved to its own dedicated section (Art. V. § 7), this was done for clarity purposes and had no legal
effect. See City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152, 159 (Minn. 2017).

5

Id.

9
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10
See Address by James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention ( July 28, 1788) reprinted in 4 The Founders Constitution 17-18 (P. Kurland
& R. Lerner ed. 1987) (emphasis added).
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II. Nothing in the 1896 Amendment Required
Unanimity

While the Minnesota electorate chose in 1896 to amend
the Governor’s previous plenary pardon power with a
requirement that it be exercised “in conjunction with” the
new Board of Pardons, nothing in the proposed amendment
put the electorate on notice that this change might subject
the Governor’s power to a unanimity requirement. To the
contrary, boards were ubiquitous in early America in all walks
of life – religious, educational, governmental and business –
and early Americans were fully familiar with their traditional
mode of operation, in keeping with prevailing republican
norms: one person, one vote and majority rule.
A. Boards in Early America Operated by Majority
Rule

Relying on invaluable research and analysis from Scott
Dewey, J.D., Ph.D, a historian at the University of Minnesota
Law School, MACDL argued that the Minnesota electorate
understood the word “board” in the phrase “board of
pardons” to mean a group of individuals who operated on a
majority-vote basis – underscored by a study of how boards
– whether corporate, school, church, municipal – operated
at the turn of the 20th Century.
The post-Revolutionary United States inherited English

majority rule. Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries
discussed majority rule in the context of corporations as
follows:
The same principle prevails in these incorporated
societies as in the community at large, and the acts of
the majority, in cases within the charter powers, bind the
whole. The majority here means the major part of those
who are present at a regular corporate meeting. There is
a distinction taken between a corporate act, to be done
by a select and definite body, as by a board of directors,
and one to be performed by the constituent members.
In the latter case a majority of those who appear may
act; but in the former a majority of the definite body
must be present, and then a majority of the quorum
may decide.14
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw in a Massachusetts Supreme
Court opinion, in the context of considering the validity of a
transaction made by directors of an insolvent manufacturing
corporation, noted:
In ordinary cases, when there is no other express
provision, a majority of the whole number of an
aggregate body who may act together constitute a
quorum, and a majority of those present may decide
any question upon which they can act.15

Eden Francis Thompson, An Abridgment of Kent’s Commentaries on American Law 134-135 (1886) (emphasis added).

Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 110 (2004).

law and legal culture and generally remained close to them, The republican roots of board voting and decision-making
including with regard to public and private corporations and deepened further in the United States throughout the
similar institutions. Thus, the First Bank of the United States, nineteenth century. Already from an early date, New York
established in 1791, was patterned after the Bank of England State established by law the general default rule of majority
and similarly borrowed the term “director;” whereas the latter rule on boards in its Revised Statutes: “that when any power
institution had 24 directors on its board, the former added or duty is confided by law to three or more persons, it may
a twenty-fifth member as a potential tie-breaker in votes.13
be performed by a majority of such persons, upon a meeting
16
Towering figures of early American law reaffirmed the general of all, unless special provision is otherwise made.” New
default rule that corporate and other boards governed by York’s revised 1890 Corporation Law similarly established
13

Sargent v. Webster, 13 Mass. 497 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., 1847) (emphasis added).

14
15

16
In re Fourth Avenue, 11 Abb.Pr. 189 (NYS Sup. Ct. Gen’l Term, 1854) (adding further, “This was a familiar principle of law, known to those who
framed the present Constitution, and long before adopted, as it was found necessary and beneficial in practice, and it had never been complained of.
It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended to repeal it in this case, by a covert means[.]”); see also, e.g., People ex rel. Hawes v.
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majority rule by quorum as a general default: “When that “[t]he board would usually have the authority, by
the corporate powers of any corporation are to be exercised by majority rule, to write the corporation’s bylaws, and generally
any particular body or number of persons, a majority of such run the firm.”20 From back then through the present,
body or persons, if it be not otherwise provided by law, shall “American corporation statutes [have] provide[d], … that
be a quorum; and every decision of a majority of such persons a corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of
duly assembled as a board, shall be valid as a corporate act.”17 its board of directors,” which has become a “universal norm
in American corporate law” as well as the “prevailing model
In the same vein, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reiterated of corporate governance around the world.”21 “The second
the principle of majority vote in the context of commissioners concept underlying th[is] board-centered model of corporate
appointed to partition an estate:
governance is that a group composed of peers acting together
22
We do not think the report of the commissioners was makes the decisions” – by one person, one vote majority rule
invalid merely because it was not unanimous. We think unless otherwise clearly specified.
the true rule is, that where three or more persons are B. No State Board of Pardons in 1896 Required
charged with a judicial or quasi judicial function under an Unanimity
authority derived, not from the parties in interest merely,
but from a law or statute of the state, though all must hear With invaluable research and analysis from Margaret Colgate
and deliberate together, a majority may decide, unless it Love, former U.S. Pardon Attorney and the nation’s leading
is otherwise provided. The counsel for the defendants expert on pardons, MACDL’s brief next pointed out that no
admit that this is a rule when the power to be exercised state board of pardons in 1896 required unanimity.
is of a public nature[.]”18
Critically, the majority-rule requirement was included
A leading treatise throughout the nineteenth century explicitly in eight of the nine constitutional pardon boards
on American corporation law similarly emphasized, created by other states prior to Minnesota’s amendment of
“Corporations are subject to the emphatically republican Article V of its Constitution in 1896; only one other state’s
principle (supposing that charter to be silent), that the whole constitution, South Dakota’s, was silent on this point. Like
are bound by the acts of the majority, when those acts are Minnesota, all nine of these state constitutional pardon
boards were composed of high-level government officials.
conformable to the articles of the constitution.”19
And while the operation and structure of these boards
differed from the Minnesota one, in no state was the vote
As a result, already by the early 1800s if not even sooner in
America, it was generally understood regarding corporations

18

17

Joseph K. Angell & Samuel Ames, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate 534, Chap. XIV, § 499 (1882); see also id. at 537, § 501.

Townsend v. Hazard, 9 R.I. 436, 442 (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1870) (emphasis added).

New York State General Corporation Law, L. 1890, p. 1063, c. 563, § 17 (effective May 1, 1891).

Walker, 2 Abb.Pr. 421, 23 Barb. 304 (NYS Sup. Ct., 1856); People ex rel. Andrews v. Fitch, 9 A.D. 439, 441; 41 N.Y.S. 349, 351 (N.Y.S. Sup. Ct., App.
Div., 1896); People ex rel. Crawford v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 428, 453 (Colo. Sup. Ct., 1877) (“In the case of a corporation, if a corporate act is to be done,
by a definite body, as by a board of directors or trustees, where the charter and by-laws are silent, a majority, at least, must be present to constitute a
quorum, but a majority of that quorum may do the act.”); Schofield v. Village of Hudson, 56 Ill. App. 191, 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1894).

19

21

Id. at 94.

Gevurtz, Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, at 92.

20
Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J. Econ. Hist. 645, 652 (Sept.
2008).
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The adoption the following year in 1897 of the statute
conditioning the governor’s power to pardon on the
agreement of the other two board members imported hard
legal limits on the governor’s power into a constitutional
scheme that by its terms did not provide any. Significantly,
the unanimity rule imposed stricter limits on the governor’s

of one member alone permitted to veto a pardon grant of gatekeeper model, the negative vote of a single member of the
the governor.23 These were the models before the people of board was not sufficient to veto a governor’s pardon decision.
Minnesota when it adopted its pardon board in 1896.
In short, explicitly in eight of the nine states that had
Nevada Florida, Idaho and Utah, followed a model first established constitutional pardon boards before the
established by New Jersey before the Civil War: removing the Minnesota amendment of 1896; and implicitly in the ninth
pardon power from the governor and vesting it in a pardon state, South Dakota, a pardon could issue only if authorized
board, of which the governor was one member. In these state by a pardon board majority. In none of them, however, could
constitutions, governors had no power to pardon apart from a single member of the board other than the governor (if on
their membership on the pardon board.
the board), or a board minority, stop a pardon from being
issued.
In all five of these state boards, cases were decided by majority
vote, and in four state boards the governor had to be part of These were all the models of constitutional pardon boards
the majority.24 Importantly, while a pardon could only be available for consideration by constitutional reformers in
granted by majority vote, a pardon could not be denied by the Minnesota in the late 1800s and the Minnesota electorate
negative vote of a single board member (unless that negative when it voted in 1896 to add a pardon board to the provision
vote was the governor’s).
situating responsibility for pardoning in the governor
personally. At that time, Americans knew well how boards
and majority voting worked. The establishment of boards and
the utilization of majority voting were both in keeping with
America’s culture of republican institutions and practices that
had evolved since the American Revolution, and, indeed,
even before, during colonial times. One-person-one vote and
majority voting had become ingrained in the whole culture.
The other four states with constitutional pardon boards
– Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Montana and South Dakota –
established what have been called “gatekeeper” boards:25 the
governor alone remained responsible for granting pardons,
but controls were imposed on the governor’s actions through
a separate board. These boards, which were usually composed
of high officials but did not include the governor, had to
approve a pardon before it could be granted by the governor.
In three of the boards, a majority vote was explicitly specified.
In one, South Dakota, the voting procedure was not specified,
but a leading treatise on the operation of state pardon
boards published in 1922 indicates that South Dakota did
not operate on a unanimity basis.26 Thus, even under this

23
In the eight states that expressly established majority rule on their pardon boards, this was explicit; in South Dakota, this relationship
arguably was implicit, in light of the long-established American tradition of majority rule on boards and commissions described in section 2,
supra. See also Christen Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the United States 16 (Chicago University Press 1922) (“Pardoning Power”) (listing
Minnesota and two states that formed pardon boards after Minnesota, North Dakota and Connecticut, as the only ones requiring unanimous
action, and thus, implicitly that South Dakota only required at most a majority vote).
24
The one state that did not require the governor to be part of the approving majority was Idaho. Note that while a pardon might be granted in
Idaho without the governor’s approval, a pardon supported by the governor could not be denied by the vote of a single board member, as would
be the case with a valid unanimity requirement.
25
See Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President Can Learn from the States, 9 U. St. Thomas L.J. 730,
746 (2012).
26
See Pardoning Power at 16 (listing Minnesota and two states that formed pardon boards after Minnesota, North Dakota and Connecticut, as
the ones requiring unanimous action, and not including South Dakota in this list).
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power to approve a pardon than those applicable to his
counterparts in any of the nine other board states, where
majority rule governed the board’s operations. That is, in eight
of the other nine board states whose examples were before
the Minnesota legislature in 1897 (and, again, implicitly in
the ninth), a governor could never be held hostage by the
refusal of a single board member to approve a pardon. Not
only was Minnesota’s statutory unanimity unauthorized by
the constitutional language, it resulted in giving Minnesota’s
governor less authority to pardon than the governor in any
of the other board states.
It was also, as noted above, antithetical to the republican
foundations of American civic and business life. And it was
antithetical to the spirit animating the concept of executive
pardon power in general: to give effect to feelings of empathy
and mercy towards a fellow “human creature.”27

Conclusion

27

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (clemency is the “fail safe” of our system).

See Federalist No. 74.

Clemency was designed to be the “fail safe” of our criminal
legal system.28 But in 1897, when the Minnesota legislature
enacted legislation to implement the 1896 constitutional
amendment, its decision to grant a veto power to any
one member of the Board of Pardons engaged in an
unconstitutional usurpation of the governor’s clemency
power. The result of this power grab has been decades of
parsimonious use of an important check on unduly punitive
criminal laws and practices. MACDL’s amicus brief urges
the Supreme Court to restore the Governor’s constitutional
clemency power to one that reflects the humanity principles
underlying the decision of early Minnesotans to continue to
repose it individually in their governor, supported by a Board
of Pardons created in the republican tradition.

28
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